


TOP SECRET

25X1



5 August 1965



Copy No. C 145

25X1



# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

25X1



GROUP 1  
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING  
AND DECLASSIFICATION

State Dept. review completed

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/11/20 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008400300001-5

Approved For Release 2002/11/20 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008400300001-5

5 August 1965

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

1.
2. USSR: Rumors of shake-up in high leadership continue to circulate. (Page 4)
3. Greece: The collapse of the Novas government clears the way for new efforts to end the political crisis. (Page 5)
4. Congo (Leopoldville): Aid to the rebels via Tanzania increasing. (Page 6)
5. Dominican Republic: Bosch's recent decision not to return will further split his party. (Page 7)
6. Notes: Sudan-Congo; West Germany - Rumania. (Page 8)

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/11/20 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008400300001-5

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/11/20 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008400300001-5

USSR: Rumors of a shake-up at the highest levels of Soviet leadership continue to circulate among foreign observers and apparently within the Soviet party itself.

The most persistent rumor is that party head Brezhnev has proven to be ineffective and is soon to be replaced by Presidium member Shelepin, a younger and supposedly more aggressive man. Brezhnev would be demoted to the largely honorific post now held by President Mikoyan, who would be moved aside. Premier Kosygin would retain his position as head of government.

These rumors cannot be substantiated. Shelepin has been considered a possible ultimate contender for the top party post. He also is, however, a protégé of Brezhnev who apparently retains good relations with both the military and the security apparatus. Brezhnev's apparent preference for working behind the scenes may have given rise to a false impression of ineffectiveness.

The new regime has taken some major decisions, such as the far-reaching 1966-70 agricultural program, which suggests that a workable arrangement exists among the policymakers. The regime is still confronted, however, by extremely difficult problems, including economic reforms and the allocation of resources in the 1966-70 plan. These issues could generate strains resulting in a shake-up at the top, despite a genuine desire to maintain an appearance of strength and unity in the collective leadership.

There is no firm evidence that existing policy disputes have moved this far.

25X1

5 Aug 65

4

25X1

\*Greece: The collapse of the Novas government last night by a parliamentary vote of 167 to 131 clears the way for new efforts to end the three week-old political crisis.

The King is determined, however, not to permit former prime minister Papandreou to return as head of the government.

[The Palace indicated earlier that it was considering a three-phase course of action. Constantine will first consult the leaders of the Center Union (CU), probably excluding Papandreou, regarding a successor to Novas. He has not rejected Stephanopoulos as a candidate but does not favor him. ]

25X1

[ ] regards Defense Minister Kostopoulos as a possible choice.]

25X1

[If the CU leaders fail to come up with a solution, the King will then try to organize a coalition government of "certain elements" of the CU, the National Radical Union, and the Progressive Party and choose a nonpolitical figure as prime minister. If he is unable to achieve a successful coalition or any other constitutional solution, he will probably then proclaim a military dictatorship, possibly with a civilian figurehead as prime minister.]

[In any case, if the political situation suddenly gets out of hand or turns to the left, troops loyal to the Palace will be deployed to enforce a temporary dictatorship until calm is restored.]


The US Embassy feels that the Greek people are not prepared for military intervention in the present crisis and that a military solution would encourage Communist elements in the country to resort to armed resistance with the risk of eventual infiltration of former Greek guerrillas who fled from Greece in 1949. The Papandreou faction also has made thinly veiled allusions to the possibility of Communist insurgency. ]

25X1

5 Aug 65

5

## EAST AFRICA



25X1

25X1

Congo (Leopoldville): [Aid to the Congolese rebels via Tanzania appears to be increasing.]

[In July at least 300 tons of Communist-supplied munitions, the highest monthly tonnage noted so far, were reportedly shipped from Dar-es-Salaam to Kigoma, on Lake Tanganyika. Kigoma is the usual point for transshipment of arms to Congolese insurgents at Fizi across the lake.]

25X1

[ ] increasing numbers of foreign advisers are crossing the lake to help the rebels. Papers removed from a dead Cuban in the Fizi area in late June indicate that Cubans were then actively participating in rebel attacks in eastern Congo.]

[The aid increase may be timed to help the insurgents consolidate a "liberated area" in the Fizi region before a planned government offensive materializes. It now appears unlikely that the offensive can be mounted before 1 September, by which time Colonel Hoare hopes to have 325 South African mercenaries assembled in Albertville, south of Fizi.]

25X1



Dominican Republic: Juan Bosch's recent decision not to return to the Dominican Republic at this time will further split his already weakened party.

Bosch reportedly has sent a letter to leaders of his Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), saying he will not return while the OAS is present. If he maintains this position, Bosch would presumably exclude his candidacy in the OAS-supervised elections which probably will be scheduled for next year. Bosch's recent statements and actions indicate he would rather remain in an advisory role than take political office.

Earlier statements by Bosch that he would remain in exile have dismayed his followers, who feel that only Bosch can hold the PRD together. Intense infighting can be expected as the party attempts to find a leader. Some PRD leaders who have been in contact with ex-President Joaquin Balaguer may consider supporting his Reformist Party, further enhancing Balaguer's presidential chances.

25X1

5 Aug 65

7

25X1

NOTES

Sudan-Congo: [Khartoum, increasingly concerned over its inability to control the Southern Sudanese dissidents, now claims that the Congolese are making airdrops to them. Some limited aid may have crossed the border by land, but the US Embassy in Leopoldville has found no evidence that Congolese aircraft were involved. Nevertheless, Khartoum plans to present a vigorous protest to Leopoldville over these airdrops with US-supplied aircraft, and has implied that it will expect the US to make representations to Tshombé.]

25X1

West Germany - Rumania: Bonn apparently intends to proceed cautiously in its program to improve relations with Bucharest. Some recent press reports suggested that formal diplomatic ties were imminent, but a Bonn Foreign Ministry official has told the US Embassy the next step will be a cultural agreement. In pursuing the problem of diplomatic relations, Bonn will try to find a formula which would preserve some part of the Hallstein Doctrine and thus discourage nonaligned nations from justifying recognition of East Germany on the basis of Rumania's recognition of two Germanies.

25X1

5 Aug 65

8

25X1

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2002/11/20 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008400300001-5

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2002/11/20 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008400300001-5

~~TOP SECRET~~